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Abstract. Distance bounding protocols have been proposed as means
of detecting relay attacks, also known as mafia fraud. In this paper we
present the first symmetric key based distance bounding protocol that
is also resistant to so-called terrorist fraud, a variant of mafia fraud. Re-
lay attacks present a serious threat to RF security devices (contactless
smart cards, RFID tags and the like) because they undermine the im-
plicit assumption that the device is physically close to the reader when it
is operating. In applications such as physical access control this assump-
tion of physical proximity is all-important. Distance bounding protocols
require a communication channel that can exchange single bits with ex-
tremely low latency. This unconventional communication requirement
has prompted Hancke and Kuhn to assert in a recent publication [12]
that ultra wide band (UWB) radio is necessary to achieve a useful dis-
tance bounding resolution. We analyse this assertion and present a al-
ternative, novel communication approach that leverages the phenomena
of side channel leakage to deliver a low latency channel. Our proposal is
capable of detecting sophisticated relay attacks without resorting to the
considerable expense and complexity of UWB radio. We present experi-
mental results to support our arguments.
1 Introduction
Recent publications [15, 11] have highlighted the vulnerability of RF transpon-
ders to relay attacks by presenting practical, low cost attacks on ISO 14443
contactless smart cards. The relay attack is particularly insidious because it
works without the need to circumvent any cryptographic security protocols that
may be in place. ISO 14443 cards have a short operating range of 10 cm from
the card reader [1]. There is an implicit assumption that if a reader is commu-
nicating with a card, that card is actually within 10 cm of the reader. However
this assumption may not be well founded because an attacker can simply relay
the RF messages from the reader to a legitimate card that is far away and relay
the card’s responses back to the reader.
Distance bounding protocols have been proposed as a means of protecting
against relay attacks. A distance-bounding protocol is an authentication protocol
2between a prover A and a verifier B, whereby B obtains corroborating evidence
about A’s claimed identity and physical proximity at the time the protocol is
run. Distance-bounding protocols can be thought of as traditional identification
protocols enhanced with a distance-bounding mechanism. The former provides
assurance as to the identity of the prover, while the latter allows the verifier to
upper bound the distance which separates her from the prover. This dichotomy
of distance-bounding protocols into an identification mechanism and a distance-
bounding mechanism is readily seen in most proposals, which can be easily de-
composed into an identification part, matching some known identification proto-
col, and a distance-bounding part, consisting of multiple fast challenge-response
rounds. The distance between prover and verifier is upper-bounded by measuring
the time intervals between challenges being sent and responses being received.
A ←→ B¯ ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A¯ ←→ B
Fig. 1. Adversarial setting
The first distance-bounding protocol was proposed by Brands and Chaum [4]
to thwart mafia fraud - the name for relay attacks against identification proto-
cols first described by Desmedt [8]. In a mafia fraud, the adversary consists of
two parts: a rogue prover A¯ and a rogue verifier B¯, sitting in between the real
verifier B and prover A as shown in Figure 1. A¯ and B¯ simply relay the pro-
tocol messages between A and B. Hence what the adversary achieves is to fool
B into thinking that he is directly communicating with A, when in reality he is
talking to A¯. This attack does not violate the traditional security requirements
of identification protocols, however it may be a concern if the verifier incorrectly
makes assumptions as to the proximity of the prover. For example, consider the
case where B is an RF reader enforcing access control through a door and A
uses a RF proximity card to authenticate to B. A succesful mafia fraud attack
would allow an adversary to open the door when A is sitting at a restaurant
close by to B¯ who is stealthily running the identification protocol with A’s card
and relaying all the information to A¯, who is present near the door running
the identification protocol with B using the messages received from her accom-
plice. Brands and Chaum [4] described two protocols secure against mafia fraud
attacks. The underlying identification protocols are a signature based challenge-
response mechanism for one of them, and a zero-knowledge identification proto-
col for the other. These protocols use public key cryptographic operations, which
are computationally demanding for highly resource constrained devices such as
RFID tags.
1.1 Contribution and overview
The paper is presented in two parts, the first dealing with protocol specifics and
the second with implementation. Recently, Hancke and Kuhn [12] proposed a
3very efficient distance-bounding protocol which is secure against mafia fraud. In
Section 2 we review their protocol and explain why it is not resistant to terrorist
fraud. In Section 3 we propose the first symmetric key based distance-bounding
protocol which is resistant to terrorist fraud and is computationally efficient
enough to be implemented in resource constrained devices.
Hancke and Kuhn [12] have proposed the use of ultra wide band radio (UWB)
to meet the demanding communications requirements of their distance bounding
protocol. The addition of UWB would add appreciable cost and complexity to
contactless smart card integrated circuits, so it could only be justified in the
absence of simpler, lower cost alternatives. In Section 4 we present an analysis
of the communication channel requirements for distance bounding. This analysis
highlights the importance of low communication latency, which is not purely a
function of the channel bit rate. We propose a novel communication method
based on the principle of side channel leakage, that has very low latency. In
Section 5 we report on our current investigations into adapting the existing load
modulation circuitry in proximity cards to our proposed communication tech-
nique. We present experimental results indicating that a modified load modula-
tion scheme can provide sufficient timing resolution to detect sophisticated relay
attacks launched by well funded attackers. Our proposed approach avoids the
additional cost and complexity of adopting UWB radio.
The following notation is used in the rest of the paper.
– We use← to indicate assigment to a variable. If A is a set the x← A assigns
to x a random element of X according to the uniform distribution.
– {0, 1}n denotes the set of all strings of bit-length n.
– Given a string s, we use si to denote the ith less significant bit of s;
– IDU is the identity string corresponding to user U .
– time() is a function implemented at all parties that returns the internal clock
time. To measure the time between two events we use two instructions, Start
clock and Stop clock, such that Start clock ∆t assigns to = time() and
Stop clock ∆t, assigns tf = time() and ∆t = tf − to. Note that we do not
require clocks at different parties to be synchronised.
2 Hancke and Kuhn’s distance bounding protocol
Hancke and Kuhn’s [12] distance-bounding protocol is highly efficient. The pro-
tocol (see Figure 1) is based on a symmetric-key identification mechanism, where
the prover and verifier share a common secret value s. The distance is param-
etised by the maximum challenge-response delay allowed, ∆tmax. The protocol
starts by having A and B exchange random nonces rA and rB . The prover then
applies a keyed hash function1 h to the concatenation of the nonces rA‖rB to get
1 Hancke and Kuhn [12] specifically require that this function be one-way and collision
resistance. We notice however that this is clearly insufficient and that h should be
pseudo-random. Otherwise, if not all the bits in d are pseudo-random, an adversary
will have an advantage in responding to a proportion of the challenges. Also note
that pseudo-randomness implies collision resistance and one-wayness.
4d. The prover splits d into two n-bit strings l and r. A fast n-round challenge-
response phase begins then. At each round, B sends challenge bit αi, to which
A must respond with the ith bit of l if βi = 0, and the ith bit of r if βi = 1.
The verifier checks that the received response is correct. (He can do so, since
he can also compute l and r.) Additionally, B measures the time ∆ti elapsed
between challenge and response. B makes sure that all delays ∆ti are less than
the bound ∆tmax. If all checks are succesful, B outputs accept, otherwise B
outputs reject.
Shared Information: Secret key s.
A B
(Prover) (Verifier)
rA ← {0, 1}m rB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− rB ← {0, 1}m
d← h(s, rA‖rB) rA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ d← h(s, rA‖rB)
l← β1‖ · · · ‖βn l← β1‖ · · · ‖βn
r ← βn+1‖ · · · ‖β2n r ← βn+1‖ · · · ‖β2n
α← {0, 1}n
For i = 1 to n do:
αi←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start clock ∆ti
βi ←
(
li : αi = 0
ri : αi = 1
βi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop clock ∆ti
Check βi
Check ∆tmax ≥ ∆ti
End for
Protocol 1: Distance bounding protocol resistant against terrorist attacks
If B accepts, assuming that information cannot travel at a speed higher than
the speed of light c, then the distance between A and B is upper-bounded 2 by
c∆tmax/2.
Hancke and Kuhn [12] showed that the probability that a mafia fraud attacker
has to make B falsely accept is bounded by
(
3
4
)n.
Terrorist fraud Desmedt [8] considered another type of active attacks against
identification protocols, which he called terrorist attacks. Here, unlike mafia fraud
attacks where the prover is oblivious to the attack that is underway, the prover
conspires with A¯ and B¯ to intentionally try to fool the verifier as to A’s location.
Defending against terrorist attacks is more difficult, since A’s secret information
2 A better bound can be obtained when we know the time ∆tp that it takes for A to
process a challege. In this case, the distance is bounded by c(∆tmax −∆tp)/2.
5(e.g. authentication keys) may be used in a manner which is differerent to what
the protocol prescribes. Clearly, if A is prepared to released her secret authen-
tication keys to A¯, then the attack is trivially successful. When dealing with
terrorist attacks, we preoccupied ourselves with attacks where the prover does
not reveal to her accomplices secret information that will allow the accomplices
to impersonate A in more than a single run of the protocol. In particular, A does
not reveal her long term private key.
Protocol 1 is not secure against terrorist fraud attacks. A remote A can
always relay r and l to a rogue prover A¯ who is close by to B. Note that the
time-critical phase does not start until B sends the first challenge bit, and that
releasing r and l does not compromise the long-term secret s.
To the best of our knowledge, the only distance-bounding protocol that pro-
tects against terrorist fraud attacks is the protocol of Bussard [5]. His solution
is public-key based and uses zero-knowlege techniques, which makes it compu-
tationally expensive, especially for implementation in low-cost RF computing
devices, such as RFID tags. The basic idea of Bussard’s protocol is to force the
prover to give away her private key in order to mount a terrorist attack. The
prover computes c = Ek(skA), the encryption of her long-term (important) pri-
vate key skA under a newly generated session key k. The verifier then sends
challenge bits αi to the prover. If αi = 1, the prover must respond with the bit
ci from the ciphertext. If αi = 0, the prover returns the bit ki of the session
key. Thus, in order to successfully and timely reply to the challenges the prover
must be in possesion of c and k, and therefore of skA. This is better illustrated
in Section 3, where we apply the same basic idea to Protocol 1.
Distance Fraud Finally, there is one more attack against distance-bounding
protocols that must be considered, and which Bussard [5] refers to as distance
fraud. In this type of attack the prover on her own tries to subvert the security
of the protocol by having the verifier believe she is close by, when in fact she is
not. This is the simplest attack that distance-bounding protocols should defend
against. Note that terrorist fraud resistance implies distance fraud resistance.
3 New distance-bounding protocol
As indicated in Section 2, Bussard’s protocol [5] protects against terrorist fraud
attacks, but its use of asymmetric techniques makes it computationally demand-
ing. On the other hand, the more computationally efficient protocols published,
based on symmetric key authentication, do not afford terrorist fraud resistance.
In this section, we propose the first symmetric key based distance-bounding
protocol which is resistant to terrorist fraud attacks and is efficient enough for
implementation in low cost devices. We enhance the protocol of Hancke and
Kuhn [12], which is to our knowledge the most efficient mafia-fraud resistant
protocol, by applying the basic idea behind the terrorist fraud resistance of Bus-
sard’s protocol. The result is shown as Protocol 2. The efficiency of the new
protocol remains practically unchanged with respect to Hancke and Kuhn’s [12],
6the main difference being the addition of a symmetric encryption (in practice,
an xor operation as discussed below).
Shared Information: Secret key s.
A B
(Prover) (Verifier)
rA ← {0, 1}m IDB , rB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− rB ← {0, 1}m
k ← KDF(s, IDA‖IDB‖rA‖rB)
c← Ek(s) IDA, rA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ k ← KDF(s, IDA‖IDB‖rA‖rB)
c← Ek(s), α← {0, 1}n
For i = 1 to n do:
αi←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start clock ∆ti
βi ←
(
ci : αi = 0
ki : αi = 1
βi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop clock ∆ti
Check βi
End for
Protocol 2: Distance bounding protocol resistant against terrorist attacks
In Protocol 2, we have made explicit the identities of prover and verifier by
adding them in the initial exchange of nonces. This is considered sound protocol
engineering practice. Both A and B now use a key derivation function KDF to
derive a symmetric encryption key k, which is used to encrypt the long-term
shared secret s. The range of both KDF and E is {0, 1}n. The fast challenge-
response phase of the protocol is similar to Hancke and Kuhn’s, except that now
the ith bit of the ciphertext c is returned when αi = 0 and the irm bit of the key
k otherwise. Note that knowledge of k and c is equivalent to knowing the shared
secret s, since s = Dk(c).
Security We will now show that Protocol 2 is secure against distance, mafia
and terrorist fraud. We do so by proving that the success probability of any
realistic (i.e. polynomial-time) adversary is negligible3 in n. The assumptions
made in the following analysis are as follows:
1. KDF is pseudo-random, i.e. when s is a secret of high enough computa-
tional entropy, the output of the function is computationally indistinguish-
able from uniformly random. In practice, KDF can be a MAC algorithm
such HMAC [3].
3 A probability function (n) is said to be negligible on n when, asymptotically, it
grows slower than the inverse of all polynomials in n.
72. E is a semantically secure encryption function, i.e. an adversay does not learn
any (computational) information about the plaintext. In practice, because
the strings to be encrypted are short and the key varies for each run of the
protocol, we can use a one-time pad, i.e Ek(s) = s⊕ k.
Theorem 1. Protocol 2 is secure against distance fraud.
Proof. To mount a distance fraud attack, the prover, who is not close to the
verifier, must respond to the challenges within the short interval ∆tmax. Since A
is not close by, she must send the response before she receives the challenge. The
best she can do is to guess the challenge and answer according to that guess.
This guess will be correct with a probability of 1/2, and hence the probability
that B accepts is (1/2)n, which is negligible. uunionsq
Theorem 2. Protocol 2 is secure against mafia fraud.
Proof. (Sketch) Here the adversarial setting corresponds with the one depicted in
Figure 1. A is honest, in the sense that she does not cooperate with the attackers
A¯ and B¯, and A is not close to B, which implies that it is not physically possible
for A¯ and B¯ to pass on the challenge to A, get the response from A and relay it
back to B in time. k is different for each run of the protocol with overwhelming
probability due to the inclusion of the nonce rA in the key derivation function.
This together with assumptions 1 and 2 above, implies that it is impossible for
any adversary to guess any bit ki or ci with probability non-negligiby different
from 1/2. Hence the best A¯ and B¯ can do is guessing the challenge bit before it is
output by B and send it to A. This could be done before the challenge response
phase starts. For example, B¯ withholds message 2 for a time long enough to
allow him to complete a run of the protocol with A, using challenges α¯i chosen
by B¯ himself. B¯ then passes to A¯ the value rA, the challenges α¯1, . . . , α¯n, and the
responses β¯1, . . . , β¯n. A¯ then completes the protocol with B. Since B choses the
challenges αi uniformly at random, on average only half of the challenges α¯i will
coincide. When this happens, then A¯ can send the valid response β¯i; otherwise,
A¯ can only guess the right reponse with probability 1/2. Overall, the probability
that A¯ and B¯ fool the verifier into accepting is essentially (3/4)n, which again
is negligible. uunionsq
Theorem 3. Protocol 2 is secure against terrorist fraud.
Proof. (Sketch) It follows from Theorem 2 that in order to have B accepting,
someone close to B must have k and c, which only A can generate. Since knowing
k and c implies knowing s = Dk(c), and since A is assumed not to give away her
long-term secret s, we must conclude that it is A who is close by. uunionsq
Noise errors In practice, as discussed by Hancke and Kuhn [12] and further
elaborated in Section 4, the communications link between prover and verifier
during the fast challenge-response phase is unreliable. This means that the pro-
tocol should tolerate transmission errors during that phase, by increasing the
number of challenge-reponse rounds according to the expected error rate. We
refer the reader to Hancke and Kuhn’s paper [12] for the quantitative analysis.
8Comparison with existing schemes Table 1 presents the list of distance-
bounding protocols that we have found in the literature and classifies them
according to the following criteria:
– Identification technique: whether the underlying identification protocol is
based on asymmetric, symmetric or zero-knowledge techniques (see Menezes
[17]).
– Unilateral/Mutual: whether the protocol authenticates the identity and prox-
imity of one or both participants.
– Mafia fraud resistance: does the protocol defend against mafia fraud attacks.
– Terrorist fraud resistance: does the protocol defend against terrorist fraud
attacks.
– Distance fraud resistance: does the protocol defend against distance fraud
attacks.
The new proposal is the only scheme that employs symmetric authentication
techniques and is secure against all types of attacks. The protocol by Capkun et
al . [6] provides mutual entity authentication as well as proximity authentication,
i.e. A and B are both prover and verifier of each other. We have tried to design
a mutual distance-based protocol version of the new protocol, however, in terms
of efficiency, it does not appear possible to do significantly better than running
the fast challenge-response phase twice.
Protocol Type Uni/Mut Dist. Mafia Terr.
Brands & Chaum-I [4] asym uni yes yes no
Brands & Chaum-II [4] zk uni yes yes no
Sastry et al . [18] sym uni yes no no
Capkun et al . [6] sym mut yes yes no
Capkun & Hubaux [7] sym uni yes yes no
Hancke & Kuhn [12] sym uni yes yes no
Bussard [5] zk uni yes yes yes
New proposal sym uni yes yes yes
Table 1. Comparison of existing distance-bounding protocols
4 Communications requirements for to distance bounding
In this section we analyse requirements and implementation issues associated
with the communications channel used in the time critical phase. We propose a
novel communication approach that exploits the underlying principle of a secu-
rity vulnerability, namely side channel leakage, in a constructive way to provide
the necessary distance bounding resolution for constrained devices (particularly,
ISO 14443 contactless smart cards).
9The communication requirements of a distance bounding protocol are both
demanding and unconventional - to achieve useful distance resolution they re-
quire extremely low communication latency but they do not require a corre-
spondingly high bit rate since in the time critical phase, they exchange single
bits punctuated by processing delay. A communication channel that can detect
and correct errors may actually be a disadvantage because reliability mechanisms
introduce overheads; more bits need to be exchanged but more importantly, an
additional and possibly variable number of processing cycles is required to de-
tect and correct errors. As we noted in Section 3, bit errors caused by channel
noise can be tolerated by simply by increasing the number of challenge response
rounds.
The reason why variable processing time for the prover is a problem is be-
cause it makes it difficult to isolate signal propagation time, which is the goal
of the time critical phase of a distance bounding protocol. Total elapsed round
trip time for a challenge response round comprises two components: processing
time and propagation time. To reliably isolate the propagation component, the
processing component should be small and invariant. For inductively powered
devices, propagation time is going to be a very small percentage of total round
trip time. For example, an ISO 14443 contactless smart card has a maximum
operating distance of 10 cm [1] so the round trip signal propagation time is two
thirds of a nanosecond. At the standard reader supplied clock rate of 13.56MHz,
a single clock cycle takes 74 ns, enough time for a signal to propagate 22 m.
Variation in processing time presents a real challenge to the accuracy of tim-
ing based solutions. An attacker may be able to accelerate a legitimate card’s
processing by providing it with a higher frequency clock signal (overclocking) to
absorb the delay introduced by a relay attack.
4.1 Preventing accelerated prover processing
ISO 14443 type contactless smart cards are passive devices that receive their
power via inductive coupling with the 13.56 MHz magnetic alternating field
generated by a reader device’s antenna coil [1]. The standard requires the reader
to supply the RF operating field within a tolerance of ±7 kHz. Therefore, where
a card uses the operating field as the source of its internal clock signal, (as is
common) it only needs to accept a frequency that is 0.05% greater than 13.56
MHz. There are two main approaches to stop an attacker from operating a card
at a higher than intended frequency; phase locked loop (PLL) internal clock
generators and high frequency filters. Internal PLL-based clock signal generators
are an increasingly popular choice, particularly in microprocessor cards. They
have the advantage that the frequency of the generated signal is independent of
the reader-supplied frequency. In the second case where the card uses a reader-
supplied clock signal, high frequency protection usually takes the form of a low
pass filter which resets the card when the filter threshold is exceeded. Tolerances
of the order of a few percent are possible. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
for appropriately designed hardware, an attacker can be limited to overclocking
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by no more than a few percent, thereby absorbing only 2-3 ns of introduced
delay per clock cycle of calculation.
We also assume that the attacker cannot economically defeat a legitimate
card’s protection mechanisms to extract the long term secret key to transfer
it to a faster device. This allows us to conclude that any successful distance
bounding protocol run was executed with the real card. Under these assumptions
the amount of introduced delay that can be absorbed is largely determined by
the prover’s clock frequency and the number of clock cycles required to compute
the response, (ignoring implementation specifics of the communication method
which we examine shortly). If the number can be kept small, the verifier can
account for the processing time with some accuracy, thus permitting a reliable
allocation of the portion of total round trip time to propagation.
4.2 A new approach to low latency communication
Keeping the number of clock cycles small within the existing communication
architecture of contactless smart cards is not possible because after initialisation,
they communicate via a reliable layered transport protocol. It is impractical to
reliably detect relay attacks on these devices using their existing communication
protocols, in part because of the large number of clock cycles required to process
the communication - there is too much opportunity to accelerate processing to
absorb introduced propagation delay.
To address this problem, we propose a new approach to communication that
addresses the unconventional requirements of distance bounding protocols. The
essential element of our proposal is that the verifier measures a physical side effect
of the calculation process and from this, infers the result. The general principle
that underlies this approach is not new. However, up until now, communications
channels of this type have been thought of as a serious security vulnerability,
certainly not purposely optimised and used to achieve legitimate protocol goals.
So in this sense, the proposal is to the best of our knowledge, novel. The following
sections describe the technique in the context of ISO 14443 contactless smart
cards, though it is worth noting that it is also applicable to contact smart cards
and a range of other devices that are also vulnerable to relay attacks (e.g. see
[10] for a description of relay attacks on contact smart cards).
The proposed communication technique exploits the principle of simple side-
channel analysis (SSCA) to disclose the response bit to the verifier in the time
critical phase. SSCA is based on the following observation: computation in a
microprocessor is the result of the physical process of electrons moving through
semiconductor gates. This physical process takes a finite amount of time and
consumes a measurable amount of energy which is radiated as heat and electro-
magnetic emanations. Such measurable phenomena are known as side channel
leakage. Careful analysis of these phenomena can reveal detailed information
about the internal state of the device [16].
The key advantage of communicating through side channel leakage is the
dramatic reduction in latency - the verifier can detect the response bit as the
prover calculates it, effectively being able to watch the prover in real time as
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it ‘thinks’. This eliminates the variable delays that would be introduced if the
response bit had to traverse a layered communications stack before the verifier
received it. While both power and EM side channels are possible candidates,
power has advantages in implementation simplicity. Since the verifier provides
the card’s power it is ideally placed to precisely monitor it.
What modifications are required to implement a usable power communica-
tion side channel? The card needs to implement a special XOR instruction that
is designed to have significantly different power consumption characteristics, de-
pending on the value of the output bit. This can be achieved by having the
instruction conditionally switch a resistor into the supply circuit only if the re-
sult is for example, binary one. Normally, simple side channel analysis requires
a digital oscilloscope with a reasonably high sampling frequency to analyse the
power consumption since the data dependent behaviour is subtle. This is not nec-
essary with the proposed method because the special XOR instruction can be
implemented in such a way that it produces a deliberately large power consump-
tion spike that can be detected with a simple peak detector circuit in the reader.
Moreover, within the time critical phase, spikes of this magnitude would only
be produced by the special instruction. The signaling load should be condition-
ally switched, ideally in the same clock cycle that the XOR result is calculated.
The essence of the proposal is that the switching should be as integral to the
instruction as the calculation itself. The circuitry required to implement this
instruction and the corresponding peak detector circuit can be implemented at
modest cost.
4.3 Communication latency and distance bounding resolution
Realistic attack scenarios on contactless smart cards may involve relay distances
as small as a few meters since legitimate cards are often found in the close
vicinity of a card reader. The propagation delay for this distance is of the order
of 10-20 ns, so at first glance it would appear that a useful distance bounding
protocol would need to detect delays of 10-20 ns. This is a technically demanding
requirement. ISO 14443 contactless smart cards support a base communication
rate of 106 kbits/s. At this bit rate a signal propagates 2.8 km in one bit period.
Hancke [12] argues that this bit rate is inadequate for distance bounding and
that contactless smart cards require Ultra Wide Band (UWB) radio to achieve
the necessary distance resolution to detect such short range attacks. Since the
addition of UWB radio to smart card integrated circuits would add appreciable
cost and complexity to a very cost sensitive product, it is worth examining
whether short range attacks can be detected using existing technology, applied
according to our proposed side channel leakage communication model.
ISO 14443 contactless smart cards communicate with the reader via load
modulation. A resistor in the card’s power supply circuit is switched in and
out of circuit in time with the data to be transmitted. When the resistor is
switched in, the card consumes more power and this increased consumption can
be sensed as an amplitude change (as measured in the reader’s antenna circuit)
in the 13.56 MHz carrier (fc). For Type A cards, the data is baseband encoded
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Fig. 2. Load modulation with a modulated subcarrier [9].
using Manchester binary coding and this baseband signal is modulated on a 847
kHz subcarrier using amplitude shift keying (ASK). This modulated subcarrier
signal is used to turn the load resistor on and off to modulate fc (see Figure 2).
Subcarrier modulation is used instead of direct baseband data modulation on
fc because of associated benefits with the frequency spectrum it produces. The
subcarrier generates two sidebands that contain the coded data. The sidebands
appear 847 kHz either side of fc . Since they are a reasonable spectral distance
away from the main carrier frequency, a simple filter in the reader’s receive
circuit can be used to remove fc thereby isolating one of the sidebands. Sideband
modulation has better error performance in noisy environments at a cost of
reduced usable bandwidth and relatively poor power efficiency. However, it can
be implemented using inexpensive hardware. The comb like pattern of the carrier
signal, load modulated with the baseband modulated subcarrier can be seen in
the right hand side of Figure 3. It takes 128 carrier cycles (9.4 µs) to modulate
a single bit.
Hancke notes that the distance resolution of a channel of bandwidth B is
‘roughly’ equal to c/B where c is the speed of light. According to this formula,
the distance resolution is the propagation distance in one bit period. To clarify
some of the roughness, we will examine this further: the distance resolution is
actually a function of the timing resolution - the verifier stops the clock when
the bit is received. But distance bounding protocols only need to exchange a
single bit so the timing resolution is determined by whether the prover can start
modulating the bit at an arbitrary point in time4. To make this distinction
4 In the discussion that follows we assume that the prover’s distance bounding logic
has direct access to the physical layer to modulate its response as a single bit. This
cannot be done within the existing ISO 14443 standard. Furthermore, ISO 14443
requires a card to begin modulating its response only after a defined frame delay
time (FDT) has elapsed. This means that the first response bit has to be aligned to
a bit grid defined by the FDT. In examining the principles of timing resolution, we
ignore this restriction in ISO 14443.
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more concrete, recall that the bit period of for ISO 14443 cards is 128 carrier
cycles - which equates to a propagation distance of 2.8 km. However, because the
prover is responding with a single bit sent on on a clear channel, she does not
need to wait for some bandwidth determined bit boundary to be able to start
modulating. At the instant the response is calculated the prover has the ability
to start producing a modulation peak on the main 13.56 MHz carrier. Once
chosen, the starting modulation cycle effectively determines the ending cycle
which fixes when the verifier stops the timer. From the verifier’s perspective, the
response bit can start arriving on any cycle of the carrier. With some important
qualifications which we will soon discuss, the timing resolution is closer to 1/fc
(74 ns or 22 m propagation). For ISO 14443 cards, this is a significantly finer
resolution than the bit period alone would indicate. We will soon see that this
can be improved even further if subcarrier modulation is not used.
Unfortunately, for more subtle reasons, this does not mean that usable tim-
ing resolution is purely a function of fc and independent of the bit rate. To
understand why this is so, we need to consider how a malicious adversary might
manipulate a modulation scheme to their advantage to avoid detection of a relay
attack. If a contactless smart card system is protected by a timing-based dis-
tance bounding protocol and an attacker wants to launch a relay attack against
it in the style of Hancke [11] or Kfir [15], to be successful the attacker needs
to absorb the delay that is introduced by the relay so that the round trip time
falls in the range that the verifier will accept. If the bit period is sufficiently
long, the attacker can begin modulating a guess of the response bit to the real
verifier (reader) at the expected time via the rogue prover A¯. If the delay in-
troduced by the relay devices is not too great, then at some point part way
through the modulation of the guessed bit the attacker will learn (via the rogue
verifier B¯ which relays the signals) the correct value by monitoring the response
of the real card. If the guess is wrong, the part-modulated bit can be switched
to the correct modulation pattern. If this switch occurs sufficiently early in the
bit period, the inconsistency will be interpreted as noise and the new value will
be accepted. This is possible because of the high degree of redundancy in the
subcarrier modulation method. This redundancy also means that the attacker
can read the card’s response bit well before the end of the bit period by directly
monitoring the amplitude modulation on fc rather than accessing the data via
processing a side band. To avoid this, we need to adopt a modulation scheme
that is not susceptible to having a modulated bit changed part way through the
bit period. The most effective way to do this is to reduce the number of carrier
cycles that represent a bit period. This increases the channel bandwidth but also
the susceptibility to bit errors through channel noise.
We have already noted that the timing resolution for a modulated channel
is potentially 1/fc and that for ISO 14443 cards at 13.56 MHz, this represents a
timing resolution of 74 ns. The qualification is necessary because the resolution
depends on how quickly the card can increase the load on the reader’s antenna
circuit to produce a detectable carrier amplitude change. This depends on the
quality of the inductive coupling between the card and reader antenna loops.
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The coupling quality degrades as the distance increases and it takes more cy-
cles to produce a detectable modulation change, since the card can only apply
a slowly increasing load. We have determined through experimental observation
(see Section 5) that at closer distances, a card can produce a detectable modu-
lation peak within a half cycle. This means that the timing resolution can be as
low as 1/2fc or 37 ns, the period between successive carrier peaks.
Rogue relay devices introduce detectable delays We have noted that
the propagation delay for short range relay attacks is of the order of 10-20 ns.
So at first glance it would appear that even in the best case (37 ns), a 13.56
MHz carrier will not be able to provide the required timing resolution. However,
this overlooks a crucial observation - relay attacks introduce unavoidable delays
beyond the time it takes the signal to propagate through the air. The rogue relay
devices themselves each incur a circuit propagation delay known as group delay
or envelope delay - the amount of time that the amplitude modulated signal is
delayed by its passage through a device [14]. For example, Hancke’s relay attack
introduces a total delay of 15-20 µs for a relay distance of only 50 m. A signal
could propagate over a 6 km round trip in this time. Given that the actual
distance is 50 m, the delay contribution of the relay devices is clearly significant.
Hancke’s attack was a proof of concept that used inexpensive RF relay equipment
with a high group delay of approximately 4 µs. Microwave transceivers operating
at gigahertz frequencies can have group delay in the order of tens of nanoseconds
[2]. This type of equipment is typically found in signals intelligence applications
and is both expensive and exotic5. Less costly equipment will have a significantly
higher group delay and will therefore be easier to detect.
The key reason why it may not be necessary to resort to UWB radio as
Hancke has suggested [12] is due to the unavoidable group delay introduced by
the relay devices. The relayed signal needs to pass through A¯ and B¯ in two direc-
tions so the group (circuit) delay of the relay devices introduces approximately
40 ns of cumulative delay. Because of this, we argue that a distance bounding
protocol only needs to be able to detect an introduced delay of approximately
50 ns to still be able to detect highly sophisticated short range relay attacks by
well funded attackers. With some limitations, this is achievable using amplitude
modulation of a 13.56MHz carrier because positive or negative carrier peaks oc-
cur every 37ns. The introduced delay is detectable because it is greater than the
period between carrier peaks.
In summary, the ISO 14443 card to reader modulation scheme is inappro-
priate for the time critical phase of a distance bounding protocol, not simply
because of its low bit rate but because the large number of carrier cycles per bit
makes it easy for an attacker to manipulate - by guessing the response bit and
changing the modulation pattern part way through the bit period if the guess
turns out to be wrong. Introduced relay delays for short range attacks (which
5 The Macom SMR-4820 Compact Microwave Search Receiver claims
a group delay of <15ns for 10MHz output bandwidth. See
http://www.macom.com/sigint/PDF/4820.pdf for product specification sheet.
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are the most difficult to detect) can be absorbed in this way. To address this
shortcoming without resorting to the significant expense of implementing UWB
radio in the smart card we propose the following modifications: to replace the
subcarrier method of communication in the time critical phase with a simple
peak detection approach on the main carrier. When the XOR response to the
challenge is logical one, the card’s load resistor is switched into circuit (via a
special XOR instruction) and this produces an amplitude change in the reader
antenna circuit. If the result is zero, the resistor is not switched and there is
no change. Whilst being susceptible to noise errors, (which can be accommo-
dated by adjusting the number of rounds), this scheme has very low latency and
minimises the attacker’s ability to guess and subsequently change the bit they
are modulating. The card should implement the protocol in such a way that it
calculates its response in the smallest possible fixed number of carrier cycles.
The verifier will know how many cycles the card requires, allowing it to sample
the amplitude of the carrier in a window starting at at the nominated cycle, to
detect zero or one by the absence or presence of a peak. If the genuine card’s
responses are being communicated via a relay the introduced delay will push
the modulation peak onto a later cycle. Note that side channel defense measures
(active power consumption filters, random delay cycles etc.) would need to be
disabled during the time critical phase. To protect the long term key, the card
must introduce its own randomness into the bits that are XORed with the key.
5 Investigations into modulation latency
We hypothesized that a contactless smart card could alter its power consumption
using existing load modulation circuitry to communicate in our proposed style of
side channel leakage, with sufficiently low latency to detect sophisticated short
range relay attacks by well funded attackers. To test the latency aspect of this
hypothesis6 we investigated the rate of change in carrier amplitude that a card
could effect via load modulation, as detected in the receive circuit of the reader.
As we have previously noted, the rate of change determines the effective timing
resolution.
5.1 Experimental setup and rationale
We used a Philips Mifare Pegoda development kit reader which conforms to the
ISO 14443 type A standard. A digital oscilloscope with a 200 MHz sampling rate
was directly attached to the receive circuit of the reader’s antenna. We captured
multiple traces of the ‘REQA’ command/response sequence with three different
models of card, all of type A (an advanced dual-interface microprocessor card,
a 4K Mifare card and a ‘Ultra Lite’ low cost Mifare card). Figure 3 shows a
complete sequence. REQA is the first command issued by the reader to the card
6 Note that we have not implemented the proposed communication method or distance
bounding protocol in an actual smart card. Such an implementation would require
very low level changes to the card operating system mask and circuitry.
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Fig. 3. REQA command/response sequence as measured in reader RX circuit.
when it comes into the reader’s field. It was chosen because the standard requires
the card to begin modulating its response a fixed number of carrier cycles after
the reader’s last command bit. This mirrors our proposal, where the card takes
a fixed number of cycles to compute its response however, in the case of REQA,
the response always begins with the modulation of a start bit - equivalent to a
logical ‘one’ in our scheme.
Traces were recorded with cards at different distances and orientations to the
reader. Orientation and distance effect the voltage across the reader’s receive cir-
cuit. The larger the distance the greater the voltage and as the voltage increases,
the rate of change that the card can effect on the carrier amplitude decreases.
Hence greater card to reader distances mean more cycles are needed to produce
a detectable change in carrier amplitude. This can be seen clearly in Figure 4
which presents the carrier for four different voltages around the time marked B
in Figure 3. The first carrier half cycle that the card attempts to modulate is
marked with a vertical line. For the two smallest voltage traces an amplitude
change is clearly evident. For the highest voltage trace, there is no discernible
amplitude change on this cycle - the first significant change can be seen one and
a half cycles later at time 0.8729 µs. We found that the rate of amplitude change
is a function of the voltage, irrespective of the orientation and distance that
produced it, so in our analysis we consider dependent variables such as delay in
detecting a modulation peak, against antenna voltage (rather than distance and
orientation which in practice are difficult to specify with precision).
In ISO 14443 type A, the reader communicates with the card via 100% am-
plitude shift keying (short suspensions of the carrier) as can be seen in the left
part of Figure 3. We aligned the traces on the first cycle that resumes the car-
rier in the last bit pause. This can be seen in Figure 5 which shows that the
alignment is precise and unambiguous. Figure 5 presents a short period of the
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Fig. 4. Card communicates to reader via load modulation. Higher antenna voltages
produce delays in effecting a detectable amplitude increase.
region marked at point A in Figure 3 for five different trace voltages. Using this
alignment as a reference point, we can confidently identify the half cycle that the
card starts its load modulation on irrespective of whether an amplitude change
is actually evident. Since we can identify this starting half cycle, we can measure
the number of cycles required to produce a detectable amplitude change and
hence characterise the timing latency at that voltage.
5.2 Analysis and results
Using Matlab, (a numerical analysis and simulation tool) we developed a model
of an amplitude peak detection circuit. The detector compares each half cycle
peak amplitude to an average of eight previous peaks of the same sign. If the dif-
ference exceeds a threshold value, the current peak is signaled as a modulation.
The choice of threshold value is important as it determines the sensitivity to
detecting true modulation peaks and also the likelihood that channel noise will
be falsely interpreted as a peak. The tradeoff between such true and false posi-
tives becomes more delicate as the antenna voltage increases because changes in
amplitude become progressively less pronounced, finally disappearing into the
noise floor. This effect can be seen in Figure 6. Each data series represents the
percentage change in amplitude for a modulation peak number versus antenna
voltage. For example, the first modulation peak shows a 30% amplitude increase
when the antenna voltage is 200 mV but at 1200 mV there is barely any dis-
cernible increase. If the reader examines the amplitudes of each trace on the
‘First Modulation Peak’ line in Figure 4 in relation to the preceding peaks, it
should be evident that the respective increases correspond to the Peak 1 series
in Figure 6.
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Fig. 5. Trace Alignment on resumption of carrier in last reader to card bit pause.
We derived a voltage-dependent function to generate the ‘Threshold’ val-
ues in Figure 6 in the following manner. Based on 1000 traces taken with one
card type at a range of voltages, we experimentally identified a threshold for
each trace (by choosing successively smaller values) that correctly identified the
modulation peaks whilst keeping false positives below a maximum of 20. Low-
ering the threshold increases the probability of detecting the real modulation
cycles as early as possible but also increases the number of false detections of
non-modulated peaks that have slightly higher amplitudes due to environmen-
tal noise. The peak detector examines approximately 2300 peaks per trace (the
portion of the carrier signal between the points marked A and B in Figure 3)
so the somewhat arbitrary false positive count of <20 loosely approximates an
false detect error rate of < 1%, based on the following rationale: in our proposal,
the card signals zero by not modulating, which is what the card is doing in
the 1150 cycles between points A and B so a threshold that produces no more
than 20 false positives in this region provides an approximation of a false detect
error rate on any individual peak of < 1% when the card sends zero (by not
modulating).
The experimentally identified threshold/voltage data pairs were fitted to a
third degree polynomial and this function was used to specify threshold values
for traces at a range of voltages for the other two card types. We found that
the voltage dependent threshold function derived from the data for one card
produced very similar true and false positive rates when used on traces for the
other cards. While we do not claim our results are conclusive in this respect due
to the small number of cards that we have examined, it appears possible that
a single voltage dependent threshold function will work across a range of cards.
This would certainly simplify the implementation of the peak detection circuitry
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Fig. 6. Percentage change in modulation peak amplitude vs. antenna voltage.
in reader devices as a simple lookup table could supply the detection threshold
for a given voltage.
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Fig. 7. Timing resolution using proposed method.
Figure 7 shows the average and maximum timing resolution as a function of
antenna voltage. The first modulation peak is reliably detectable up to 500mV, so
there is no detection delay, thus the timing resolution is 1/2fc or 37 ns. Between
500 and 800 mV there is a slight increase in the average because the first peak
is detected in only 75% of cases. We argue that the resolution up to 800mV
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is sufficient for the worst case scenario - detection of short range attacks using
exotic and expensive relay equipment with very low group delay. The average
timing resolution at higher voltages increases to 300 ns which is still 50 times
smaller than the delay introduced by Hancke’s proof of concept attack [11].
Attaining sub-50 ns resolution places a significant restriction on the card
to reader operating distance. With our reader, the card needs to be within a
few millimeters to operate in this voltage range. In practice, this would mean
that the user would need to touch the card on the reader. This reduction in
operating range is clearly a disadvantage though it is worth noting that such
fine resolution is only required to detect short range attacks using sophisticated
and expensive relay equipment. Presumably, a large payoff would be required
to motivate an attacker to go to such effort and expense, perhaps larger value
contactless payment applications or high security physical access control. In these
higher risk application scenarios it may be quite sensible to make the act of using
the card more overt and deliberate by requiring very close proximity operation.
With our reader, 300 ns resolution was attained in the 4-5 cm range. Better
distance performance may be possible and further investigation is required to
assess usable operating range. We suspect that our reader may have been down
on power as it was powered from a USB port. It could not operate a card at 10
cm, the maximum distance required by the standard. 7.5 cm was the limit of
reliable operation.
6 Future work
Further investigation is needed into the impact of different RF noise environ-
ments on modulation and detection performance. While our experiments were
carried out in a busy electrical engineering laboratory, this does not characterise
the broad range of possible deployment scenarios.
Data needs to be gathered for a much larger range of readers and cards.
Though we have not investigated it, we suspect that ISO 14443 type B cards
may have better modulation performance at larger distances. Type B does not
use 100% ASK in reader to card communications as type A does. Type A cards
need a store of energy (capacitance) to continue operating during the short
periods of carrier suspension. The availability of this reserve of power reduces
the load that the card can apply to the antenna circuit to modulate the carrier.
Interestingly, the smart card manufacturer Infineon has recently applied for a
patent [13] on a decoupling circuit that makes the power reservoir selectively
unavailable when the card is modulating. They claim that the circuit improves
the modulation performance at larger distances. It would be worth investigating
whether this innovation can further improve the operating range and effective
timing resolution for type A cards using our proposed method.
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7 Conclusion
We have proposed the first symmetric key based distance-bounding protocol
that is resistant to so called ‘terrorist fraud’, together with a security analysis.
In contrast to previous proposals the protocol is appropriate for implementation
in resource constrained devices due to its computationally efficiency.
We have analysed the unconventional requirements that distance bounding
protocols place on the communication channel used in the time critical phase,
highlighting the importance of low latency as opposed to raw bit rate. In re-
sponse to these requirements, we proposed a novel approach to communication
that leverages the phenomena of side channel leakage, heretofore considered ex-
clusively as a security vulnerability. We exploit the extremely low latency of side
channel leakage to address the requirements of distance bounding protocols.
We presented experimental results indicating that a modified form of load
modulation, used in the style of our proposed side channel leakage communi-
cation technique, can provide sufficient distance resolution to detect advanced
relay attacks on ISO 14443 smart cards. Our technique has the disadvantage of
reducing the operating range of the smart card. We have argued on the basis
of these results, that it may not be necessary to incur the additional expense
and complexity of implementing ultra wide band radio for the distance bounding
communication channel, as Hancke and Kuhn [12] have asserted.
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